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Abstract 
I suggest a new role for authority and interest in the theory of right:  Rights can be 
explicated as sets of prohibitions, permissions and commands, and they must be justi-
fied by interests. 
I argue as follows:  (1) The two dominant theories of right—“Will Theory” 
and “Interest Theory”—have certain standard problems.  (2) These problems are sys-
tematic:  Will Theory’s criterion of the ability to enforce a duty is either false or empty 
outside of its original legal context, whereas Interest Theory includes in the definition 
of a right what actually belongs to the justification of the practice within which that 
right is assigned. (3) I recast the connection between authority, interests and rights in 
a way that avoids each theory’s standard problem.  (4) The resulting theory also has 
three further advantages:  It analyzes rights in terms of very basic and familiar con-
cepts; it mirrors the understanding of rights in actual public discourse, and it is com-
patible with a wide selection of moral theories.  Since its core is about a specific use of 
modal auxiliary verbs, I call this new theory the “Modal Theory of Right.” 
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1 Introduction:  A Tale of Two Incompatible Theo-
ries and a Counterproposal 
There currently are two dominant theories of right, the Will Theory and the Interest The-
ory.  Both theories have long-known problems and both are commonly regarded as 
incompatible with the other.1  According to Will Theory, to possess a right is to be 
able to enforce or waive some duty on the part of another person.2  Thus, Will Theory’s 
main claim says: 
(W) X possesses a right R iff X is able to enforce (or waive) a duty of an-
other person, where this duty is correlative to R. 
Section 4 discusses what it would mean to “be able to enforce (or waive) a duty of 
another person,” but at the current stage our formulation of W must be vague enough 
so as to include a number of different interpretations of Will Theory. 
Will Theory’s main historical root is Kant’s “Doctrine of Right.”  Kant regards 
freedom from the interference of others as a prerequisite of human agency.  He infers 
from this a right to this freedom, which we cannot deny to anyone without contradict-
ing ourselves.  All other rights, Kant argues, are justified restrictions of this freedom 
right, and their justification lies in the protection of the freedom rights of other peo-
ple.3  Some contemporary Will Theorists take this idea one step further.  They argue 
that human agency requires a whole set of basic rights.4  One attraction of the Kantian 
framework is that it promises to give a non-normative and hence less contested justi-
fication for something that is normative and is highly contested:  Mere metaphysical 
considerations about agency are supposed to justify a substantial catalogue of basic 
rights.  One problem with Will Theory’s main claim, W, however, is its implication 
that people who are unable to enforce any duties (such as comatose patients or babies) 
are unable to possess any rights. 
According to the competing Interest Theory, to possess a right is to possess 
an interest that puts another person under some duty.5  Thus, Interest Theory’s main 
claim says: 
(I) X possesses a right R iff X has an interest that grounds a duty of an-
other person. 
Sections 6-8 discuss what it would mean for someone’s interest to “ground a duty of 
another person,” but at the current stage I, too, must remain sufficiently vague. 
Interest Theory starts from the plausible idea that rights serve a function and 
that rights usually benefit the right-holder.  Bentham is often cited as the first propo-
nent of this idea,6 but there are virtue ethicist versions, too.7  One attraction of Interest 
Theory is that it grants rights to everyone who has interests, which certainly includes 
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comatose patients and babies and which could easily be extended to animals, too.  One 
problem with Interest Theory’s main claim, I, however, is its implication that we are 
unable to possess rights which exclusively or mainly protect the interests of others.  
(An example is the right to governmental child support, which is a right of parents, 
but intended to protect the interest of their children).8  Most Will and most Interest 
Theorists see their theory as incompatible with the other; “the debates between them 
are often intense […][and] seemingly interminable.”9 
Against this standoff, I offer the following proposal:  (1) Will and Interest The-
ory are falsely seen as complete (and hence incompatible) theories of right.  We need 
Will Theory’s key concept of authority, in order to specify what it is to possess a right, 
while we must appeal to interests, in order to justify rights.  (2) Will Theory’s misconcep-
tion of the role of authority and Interest Theory’s misconception of the role of interest 
both result from a failure to distinguish three questions:  What prohibitions, com-
mands and permissions does a given right authorize?, What interests does this right 
protect? and: Who possesses this right?  In other words, both Will and Interest Theory 
fail to distinguish between the definition of rights, their justification and their possession.  
(3)  Once we make these distinctions, we can redefine the roles of authority and inter-
est in a way that avoids Will and Interest Theory’s standard problems.  I shall call the 
resulting theory the Modal Theory of Right, since the proper understanding of authority 
and interest will turn out to be through understanding a specific use of modal auxiliary 
verbs. 
I proceed as follows:  Section 2 argues that the most recent and refined attempt 
to show the incompatibility of Will and Interest Theory fails.  Section 3 distinguishes 
three questions that any complete theory of right would have to answer:  the above-
mentioned questions of the definition, the justification and the possession of rights.  
Section 4 then discusses Will Theory.  I show that Will Theory’s standard problem is 
larger than commonly discussed and that it stems from a missing explanation of how 
rights authorize.  I suggest such an explanation, which I summarize as the first claim 
of Modal Theory, M1 (Section 5).  The suggested understanding of the relation be-
tween authority and rights avoids Will Theory’s standard problem, and it answers the 
definition question.  Section 6 then turns to Interest Theory.  I suggest an alternative 
understanding of the relation between interests and rights, which I summarize as the 
second claim of Modal Theory, M2.  M2 answers the justification question.  I then 
show that M2 avoids Interest Theory’s standard problem, and that it captures the ac-
tual role of interest in debates about rights, while Interest Theory misconstrues this 
role (Section 8).  As a last step, Section 9 addresses the question of possession, the 
answer to which is M3, the third and last claim of Modal Theory.  Section 10 summa-
rizes my results. 
This paper starts from the premise that authority and interest are key elements 
of any correct theory of right.  My argument hence is conditional:  If authority and 
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interest are to play a central role in the theory of right, it will be the one described 
below. 
2 Excursus: Will and Interest Theory Have Not 
Been Shown to Be Incompatible 
Neophytes to the debate might be surprised to learn that Will and Interest Theory are 
commonly regarded as incompatible:  Don’t they stress different aspects of rights, 
rather than contradict each other?  Couldn’t we hold, for example, that to possess a 
property right in one’s savings is (among other things) to be able to enforce a bank 
clerk’s duty to pay out the respective amount and at the same time hold that the bank 
clerk’s duty is grounded in one’s interest?  In other words, is it not plausible to assume 
that rights are characterized by both, the authority they confer over other people’s 
behavior and the fact that this authority protects an interest?  This understanding does 
indeed come close to the view I shall offer below.  The current section is intended to 
alleviate principled worries regarding the very idea of such a hybrid theory.  Readers 
who are unfamiliar with the history of the debate might want to skip this meta-dialec-
tical excursus and proceed to Section 3 
Previous hybrid proposals (such as Gopal Sreenivasan’s)10 have been criticized 
by both Will and Interest Theorists.11  This criticism, however, has not established that 
Will and Interest Theory’s key ideas are indeed incompatible.  The most developed 
and probably best-known principled objection to hybrid theories of right is by the 
Interest Theorist Matthew Kramer.  Kramer argues that the incompatibility of Will 
and Interest Theory is readily apparent from the following formulations of the two 
theories:  A Will Theorist considers it “necessary and sufficient” that a right-holder, 
X, be “competent and authorized to demand/waive the enforcement of the duty that 
is correlative to the right.”  By contrast, an Interest Theorist considers this “neither 
necessary nor sufficient,” while fulfillment of a second criterion is “necessary,” viz. 
that the duty correlative to the right “normatively protects some aspect of X’s situation 
that on balance is typically beneficial for a being like X.”12  In short, Kramer argues 
that Will Theory’s claim that a certain condition is “necessary and sufficient” is incom-
patible with the claim that there is a further necessary condition – specified by Interest 
Theory.13  But this inference is invalid:  If a first criterion, CW, is sufficient for X to 
have a right, this does not logically exclude that a second criterion, CI, is necessary for 
X to have a right, since CW and CI might not be independent of each other.  For the 
two criteria in question such a dependency is indeed not just possible, but highly plau-
sible:  One of the main claims of the theory I suggest below is that the relevant type 
of authority (demanded by CW) only exists where the relevant type of interest does 
(demanded by CI).  (See section 6 for this.) 
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In addition to this, nothing about the two criteria themselves suggests that 
either of them is sufficient.  In the case of our property example, we could consider it 
necessary for the customer to be “competent and authorized” to demand payment and 
consider it necessary for this payment to be in her interest, in order for the customer 
to have a right to the payment.  Prima facie, there is no problem with the assumption 
that the two criteria are compatible, while none of them alone suffices. 
The most developed principled argument for “the untenability of a sophisti-
cated hybrid theory of rights”14 hence depends on two implausible assumptions: first, 
that the relevant kind of authority, demanded by the Will-Theoretic criterion, does not 
derive from facts about the right-holder’s interests; second, that this criterion must be 
understood as a sufficient condition.  There hence seem to be no principled objections 
against the project of a hybrid theory. 
3 Three Questions for a Theory of Right 
In the introduction, I distinguished three questions, which we can ask with respect to 
any given right R: 
(Definition) What prohibitions, commands and permissions does R au-
thorize? 
(Justification) What interests does R protect? 
(Possession) Who possesses R? 
The debate so far, I believe, suffers from a failure to distinguish these three questions.  
A recast version of Will Theory, I suggest, would answer the definition question.  A 
recast version of Interest Theory would answer the justification question.  And once 
these two questions are answered, the possession question becomes a simple empirical 
question. 
Recently, Will and Interest Theory are often understood as attempts to answer 
the possession question.  Following Wenar,15 this interpretative shift is a reaction to 
their decade-long standoff:  We might be able to explain what rights are, by explaining 
their Hohfeldian logical correlative, duties.16  Right-based duties, some believe, differ 
from other duties—e.g. duties of benevolence—in that they are directed at (i.e. owed 
to) the possessor of the right.17  (The bank clerk’s duty to pay the money, e.g., is di-
rected at me.)  The hope is that an explication of ‘directed duty’ could then serve to 
explicate the concept ‘right’.  On this understanding, Hohfeld has given us an analysis 
of rights through duties, but has failed to separate right-based duties from other duties, 
such as a duties of benevolence. 
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I doubt whether the distinction of right-based versus other duties does indeed 
line up with the distinction of directed versus non-directed duties.18  All right-based 
duties might be directed, but it seems that at least some other duties are directed, too:  
Isn’t, e.g., my duty to offer my seat on the bus to the pregnant passenger now entering 
owed to that passenger?  But unless I happen to sit on a seat reserved for people with 
special needs, she certainly has no right to my seat. 
The interpretation of Will and Interest Theory as different theories of the pos-
session of rights, however, is also problematic for a further reason:  If what I shall say 
below about rights is correct, then it would render both theories superfluous.  We 
simply do not need a theory of the possession of rights anymore if we have a theory 
of their definition and their justification. 
4 Will Theory’s Main Problem:  What Means “Can 
Enforce?” 
The standard accusation against Will Theory says that it denies rights across the board 
to certain groups of people.  Those who are generally unable to enforce any rights—
such as patients in a coma or babies—cannot have any rights within Will Theory.  This 
accusation, I shall argue, points to a consequence of Will Theory’s basic problem rather 
than its root.  Will Theory’s basic problem runs much deeper:  Any possible interpre-
tation that we can give of the concept ‘ability to enforce’ in a moral context is either 
false (in that it denies rights to people who seem to have them) or is empty. 
Modern Will Theory started as a descriptive account of the role of rights within 
Anglo-Saxon law.19  In other words, its original aim was to analyze the form and func-
tion of legal rights (within one particular legal system).  Inspired by Kant, Hart famously 
characterized legal rights as restrictions on the freedom of others, which the right-
holder may enforce.  It is the holder of such a legal right “who is a small scale sovereign” 
for Hart.20  In this legal context, to enforce simply means to sue, should the other party 
not willfully heed to your demand.21 
Contemporary Will Theory has extended its domain of application:  Will The-
ory now is a theory of rights in general: moral rights, legal rights and more—some 
current discussions of rights even include the “rights” of players in games.22  Where 
moral rights are concerned, Will Theory has furthermore become a normative theory:  
The right-holder is morally entitled to restrict the choices of others, and these others 
wrong the right-holder if they don’t comply.  At the same time, Will Theory has kept 
Hart’s characterization of the right-holder as sovereign and of rights as demands 
against others which the right-holder is able to enforce.  Outside of a legal framework, 
however, it becomes unclear what it means to be able to enforce such a demand (or to be 
authorized and competent to do so, as Kramer puts it).  In the legal case, an official system 
Katharina Nieswandt, Authority and Interest  7/23 
 
of rules is in place, as are institutions that watch over these rules, change them, prom-
ulgate them, punish transgressions, settle disagreements about the rules etc.  Within 
such a rule-governed practice with permanent social institutions, “enforcement” has a 
clear meaning:  The holder of a legal right is able to enforce that legal right in the sense 
that she has standing to sue.  Should she be unable to do so (e.g. because of a cognitive 
deficiency) some proxy will have standing on her behalf.  In some situations, she (or 
the proxy) might decide to waive the right, or it might turn out that the legal institu-
tions are malfunctioning, so that she cannot obtain due process.  What it means for 
her to have the respective right, however, is very clear, even in such cases:  There is a 
legal procedure that can be initiated—an institutional machinery that can be turned 
on, so to speak—with the aim of extorting what the right-holder has been denied. 
One important respect in which moral rights differ from legal rights is that 
such an official system of rules and social institutions is lacking in the moral case.  
Without such a system, however, it becomes unclear what it means to say that X is able 
to enforce against Y the demands that her right R entails.  There is no similar set of rules 
and, more importantly, no machinery in place that X could use against Y.  As far as I 
can see, enforcement could mean either of three things in the moral case:  (1) X is 
justified (by the rules of the respective moral practice?) in demanding that Y respect the 
demands which R entails and she is able to force Y to respect the demands which R 
entails.  (2) X is justified in demanding that Y respect the demands which R entails and 
she is able to demand that Y respect the demands which R entails.  (3) X is justified in 
demanding that Y respect the demands which R entails. 
None of these three interpretations, though, yields a result that is both plausi-
ble and interesting:  The third interpretation is empty, while the other two also expro-
priate healthy adults of most of their (apparent) rights.  To demonstrate this, let me 
spell out the result of each interpretation for two exemplary cases:  Case 1 are the 
much discussed comatose and babies.  For the second case, imagine the following 
scenario:  X leaves the room in the public library and another person, Y, takes her 
unattended laptop computer.  Assume furthermore that X indeed has a moral and not 
just a legal right to this computer.  Case 2 thus is a scenario where X possesses a right, 
but is unable to defend this right because she is not present to do so.  Table 1 lists the 
results for the two scenarios under each of our three interpretations: 
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Table 1:  Outcome (right/no right) for two scenarios on three interpretations of Will Theory. 
 
 
 
Interpretation 1 
 
 
Interpretation 2 
 
 
Interpretation 3 
 
 
X is “able to enforce” her right R against Y if … 
 
 
… X is justified in demand-
ing that Y respect the de-
mands which R entails 
and X is able to force Y to 
respect the demands 
which R entails. 
 
 
… X is justified in de-
manding this and X is 
able to demand this. 
 
… X is justified in de-
manding this. 
 
Case 1 
 
X is comatose 
or a baby. 
 
 
— 
 
— 
 
√ 
 
Case 2 
 
X is a healthy, 
absent adult. 
 
 
— 
 
— 
 
√ 
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Let’s look at each of the three columns of Table 1 in turn. 
Column 1 says that any demand of yours can only count as a right if you are in 
a position to force others to respect it.  This assigns no rights to those in row 1, since 
they are unable to force anyone to do anything.  But equally unable is the healthy adult 
from row 2, who, given her absence, cannot force Y to respect her (supposed) right in 
the computer.  She, too, has no right on this interpretation.  But few would assume 
that our property rights cease as soon as we leave the room; so this first interpretation 
seems implausible. 
Notice two things about the first interpretation before we proceed:  (1) The 
problem that absent healthy adults lose their property rights cannot be solved by in-
terposing a proxy—say, the police or ‘the state’.  For this proxy incurs the same prob-
lem as X herself; that is, it will not always be able to force Y to respect the demands 
which X’s right entails.  (The police, for instance, might never catch Y.)  (2) Notice 
also that X would not have a right either if she were present but less powerful than 
the thief.  The first interpretation, in fact, turns all rights into ‘rights of the strongest’. 
Column 2, like the previous column, awards no rights to comatose and babies, 
as both are unable to demand anything.  What about the absent adult from row 2?  
Given her absence, she, too, is unable to demand that the other respect those demands 
which her property right in the computer entails (such as: not to take this item without 
her permission).  Hence, she, too, has no right on the second interpretation, and hence 
this second interpretation is as implausible as the first.  (Notice that a proxy-solution 
would fail for the same reason as before:  The proxy will not always be able to demand 
of Y that Y respect the demands which X’s right entails.) 
At his point, Will Theorists might object by saying that I misunderstand what 
“being able to” means in our context.  A Will Theorist might say:  “Healthy adult X is 
currently not in a position to demand that Y leave her computer alone, because of cer-
tain accidental circumstances—X happens to have left the room.  But if X returned 
the next moment, she would be able to demand this.  The inabilities of those in row 2 
are accidental, while the inabilities of those in row 1 are inabilities in principle; hence it 
seems unfair to assign the same negative outcome to both.  For while Will Theory 
admittedly has a problem with comatose and babies, the suggested problem with the 
absent adult could easily be solved if we added ‘in principle’ to the interpretation listed 
in column 2.”  Following this reply, column 2 would be modified so as to read: “X is 
justified in demanding this and X is, in principle, able to demand this.”  Presupposing 
that our Will Theorist can spell out a suitable notion of “in principle,” this modification 
would indeed allow absent adults to keep their property rights.  Nevertheless, this 
modification is not an option as it would make the well-known problem from row 1 
unsolvable:  Prior to our modification, the claim that babies and comatose adults can-
not have any rights was just an unwelcome consequence of Will Theory, which its 
proponents could still hope to circumvent in the future.  But once we define right-
holders as those who are in principle able to demand what their right entails, we rule out 
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rights for babies and comatose adults by definition.  Thus, the suggested modification 
only worsens Will Theory’s situation.23  Our Will Theorist might react to this by alter-
ing her proposal as follows:  “Let’s keep the supplement ‘in principle,’ but give it a 
different reading.  Instead of saying that the comatose and the baby’s inability consti-
tute inabilities in principle and that this is what distinguishes their inability from that 
of the healthy adult, let’s treat both groups alike, as originally suggested, and say that 
they all are ‘in principle able, though currently unable’ to demand what R entails: the 
healthy adult could demand this if she were to step into the room, the comatose if she 
were to awake from her coma, the baby, had she already grown up.”  This second 
modification would indeed give us the desired result; that is, those in both rows could 
now possess rights.24  Effectively, however, this modification collapses column 2 into 
column 3.  For what could the resulting claim that X has a right if “X is justified in 
demanding this and X is in principle able to demand this” mean, on our new under-
standing of “in principle,” except that the respective person would be justified in de-
manding what R entails, were she ever factually able to demand this?  In other words, 
what would it say more than that she would be justified in demanding this?  The latter, 
however, is precisely the interpretation given in column 3—and as the following con-
siderations will show, it is not a tenable interpretation of Will Theory either. 
Column 3, in giving a less fastidious criterion, avoids all previous difficulties.  
Here, someone has a right if she would be justified in making a particular sort of de-
mand.  Whether she is able to make this demand (as column 2 required) or whether she 
is able to force others to obey her demand (as column 1 required), any such empirical 
fact is irrelevant for the question of whether or not she would be justified in making 
it.  In other words, on the third interpretation, someone’s abilities are irrelevant for 
whether or not she has a right.  What result does this claim yield for our two rows?  
Since inability does not matter, the fact that those in row 1 are in principle unable to 
make demands does not matter; that is, the third interpretation finally allows us to 
assign rights to comatose and babies.  And since inability does not matter, the fact that 
the absent adult of row 2 is currently unable to make a demand does not matter; that 
is, the third interpretation finally allows us to assign her a property right in the com-
puter.  Thus, the third interpretation gives the desired result for both test cases and 
hence seems highly plausible. 
The third interpretation, however, deprives Will Theory of all characteristic 
content.  For if we think that “to be justified in demanding” has nothing to do with an 
ability to demand (neither with a cognitive ability, nor with a suitable occasion, nor with 
actual power), then to say: “X has a right R against Y if X is justified in demanding that Y 
respect the demands which R entails” simply is to say: “X has a right R against Y if Y 
is under a duty to respect the demands to which R entitles X.”  X has a right against Y if X 
is justified in demanding of Y, and for X to be justified in demanding of Y is for Y to 
be under a duty to do as demanded by X.  On the third interpretation, X thus has a 
right R against Y if Y is under a correlative duty toward X.  This means, however, that 
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the third interpretation collapses Will Theory into the thin conceptual analysis of the 
primary meaning of right given by Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld.25  Hohfeld’s analysis is 
almost universally accepted.  Most importantly, it is accepted by Will and Interest The-
orists alike.  Therefore, if Will Theory does not go beyond Hohfeld’s analysis on any 
point, it ceases to be an independent theory of right at all.  Everything that was char-
acteristic of Will Theory—that the right-holder is comparable to a “sovereign,” who 
rules over others (albeit in a very limited domain)—has been removed.  The third 
interpretation reduces Will Theory to a definition that its main competitor as well as 
other, lesser-known alternatives willingly accept—that they, in fact, already contain. 
Our result regarding Will Theory’s criterion therefore is that, on any non-trivial 
reading (columns 1 and 2 of Table 1), Will Theory denies most people many of the rights 
that we take them to have.  The commonly discussed cases are just a tiny selection of 
all the counterexamples which Will Theory actually incurs, and new counterexamples 
can be generated systematically by imagining situations in which people are currently 
unable to defend their rights. 
5 An Alternative Role for Authority:  Claim 1 of the 
“Modal Theory of Right” 
Despite Will Theory’s problems, there is something to be said for the claim that what 
characterizes rights is that rights create a special kind of authority.  Rights indeed au-
thorize certain prohibitions, commands and permissions.  Thus, one true description 
of what it is for X to possess a right is that X enjoys certain permissions, while others 
are under certain demands—demands that can be expressed as prohibitions and com-
mands like the following: “You can’t take that—it’s X’s” (X has a property right); “He 
must do so—he assured X that he would” (X has a right as promisee); “You can’t use 
that—you’ll hurt somebody” (people in general, including X, have a right not to be 
harmed); “You will do such-and-such—and that’s an order!”, said by X herself (X, as 
superior officer, has a right to be obeyed); and so forth … 
Elizabeth Anscombe regarded the semantics of such prohibitions and com-
mands as the key to an analysis of what rights are.  She called them “stopping modals” 
and “forcing modals,” after the modal auxiliary verbs that such expressions contain.26  
Anscombe did not coin a name for the third type of relevant modal claim here, viz. 
those phrases by which we express the permissions for the holder of the right.  Fol-
lowing Roger Teichmann, I shall call these “permitting modals.”27  The first part of 
my solution builds on Anscombe’s idea that an analysis of rights must proceed through 
an analysis of the use of such deontic modals.  The example of property rights might 
serve to illustrate that idea:  For X to have a property right in a certain computer 
means:  (1) No one may take it without her permission (prohibition or “stopping modal”); 
(2) if someone destroys it, this person must compensate X (command/forcing modal), while 
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(3) X herself can destroy the computer if she feels like it (permission/permitting modal); 
(4) she may sell it to others (permission/permitting modal); and so forth.  If X has a right, 
then certain prohibitions and commands apply for others, while certain permissions 
apply for her.  Imagine we were to explain the very idea of property rights to a traveler, 
in whose culture private property did not exist.  We could do so by giving her a list of 
prohibitions, commands and permissions—or: stopping, forcing and permitting modals—
just like the ones mentioned:  “See, if this is my ‘property,’ it means that (1) no one can 
take it unless they’ve asked me, that (2) others must compensate me, if they break it, 
that (3) I may make changes to it as I like, while they …”  A complete such list would 
be a complete specification of what my right consists in; in other words, it would be 
an explication (of this particular type) of property right.28  It would thereby answer our 
first question for any theory of right, the question of definition.  The first claim of the 
new theory of right that I want to suggest here can hence be put as follows: 29 
(M1) Any right R can be defined through a set of stopping and forcing 
modals. 
By first sight, one might think that M1, just like the third reading of Will Theory on 
p. 10 above, does not go beyond Hohfeld’s analysis of rights through duties either.  
This objection is unwarranted, for the following three reasons:  (1) Hohfeld’s analysis 
explicates the concept ‘right’ through its “invariable correlative,” ‘duty’,30 whereas M1 
explicates ‘right’ through the special usage of an independent class of expressions, 
modal auxiliary verbs.  Hence, in M1, explicans and explicandum are independent of each 
other, whereas Hohfeld elucidates the relation X has a right against Y through the con-
verse relation Y has a duty against X.  (2) The explicans in M1 elucidates through some-
thing that is much more basic than the explicandum.  After all, modal auxiliary verbs 
are among the vocabulary that we learn when we first acquire language:  We are told 
as toddlers that we “must” do certain things, “can’t” do others, “may” or “may not” 
do this-and-that; that is, we learn such concepts long before we can be introduced to 
such demanding concepts as ‘a right’ or ‘a duty’.  To define rights through modal aux-
iliary verbs hence is to define rights through something very simple and fundamental 
in comparison.  (3) The explicans elucidates through something that is not specific to 
the explicandum, something with which we are familiar from many other contexts 
(and on which we hence have a much firmer grip).  For the normative use of modal 
auxiliary verbs is in no way limited to rights-contexts:  People cannot take what belongs 
to another (property right), and they need to feed their offspring (right to life).  But 
philosophers cannot infer that such-and-such if doing so would be to affirm the conse-
quent (requirement of theoretical rationality), and chess players need to move the king 
when he’s in check (rule of a game); an applicant cannot be late for her interview if she 
intends to make a good impression (requirement of practical rationality), and in some 
countries one needs to reject two times before accepting an invitation (rule of etiquette). 
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Contrary to Hohfeld’s definition (and to the third interpretation of Will The-
ory), M1 thus explicates through concepts that are independent of the concept ‘right’, 
more basic than it and familiar from other and diverse contexts.  Against M1, the 
triviality accusation hence seems unwarranted.31 
6 An Alternative Role for Interest:  Claim 2 of 
Modal Theory 
According to M1, to give a complete description of a right is to give a complete list of 
the stopping and forcing modals that correlate to this right.  What place can this new 
theory allocate to the idea that rights protect interests?  After all, Interest Theory does 
seem to capture an important aspect of rights:  If, for instance, women in Saudi-Arabia 
demand the right to drive or if homosexuals demand the right to marry, then they 
certainly take the thing demanded to protect a justified interest. 
Interest Theory refers to interests in order to describe what rights consist in, but 
on our new account this conception must be false.  Within Modal Theory, we do not 
need to refer to X’s interests if asked to specify what rights X has or what it is for X 
to have a right.  We neither need interest to define the general term “right” nor to 
define any right R, say, “right to drive.”  R will simply be defined through a set of 
stopping and forcing modals m1, …, mn, and a right is what can be thus defined. 
Now that we defined rights as sets of modals, however, a second question 
poses itself, viz.:  What justifies the usage of such a set of modals?  If, to return to our 
old example, I have a property right in a certain computer, then others must ask my 
permission to use it, can’t use it without this permission, and so forth—but why are 
they under these constraints?  After all, somebody else might need my computer more 
urgently then I do, or I might even do harmful things with it.  If there is a place for 
interest in a theory of right, I shall argue, then interest will be what justifies the usage 
of the set of modals in which a given right consists.  More precisely, I argue that inter-
ests justify at the level of the general right, not of its instantiation for a given individual. 
This claim constitutes the second part of Modal Theory, and the idea for it is 
again inspired by Anscombe.32  A full-blown defense of this account would require a 
self-standing paper.  But my aim in the current paper simply is to outline a new frame-
work that avoids the standard difficulty of current theories of right. 
We must distinguish two kinds of justifications of rights which, within our new 
framework, can be put as follows:  First, there is the question of why a certain set of 
modals applies with respect to a certain individual.  Second, there is the question of 
why this set of modals ever applies with respect to anyone.  Take again the example 
of X’s private property right in a certain computer:  There is the question of why we 
should use—with respect to X and for the case of this computer—the set of modals 
whose application would mean to grant X a property right in this item.  And then there 
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is the question of why we should ever use this set of modals with respect to anyone 
for any item, that is, why we should ever grant people property rights.  The first ques-
tion asks whether the general right R is instantiated in a given case.  The second ques-
tion asks what justifies R.  One way to conceive of this difference is as the difference 
between justification within and of the ‘private property game’, i.e., justification within 
and of a certain social practice and its rules.33  I claim that we must appeal to interest 
in order to answer the second question.  More precisely, I believe that rights are 
granted within practices, and the justification of such a practice as a whole, as well as 
of the rights granted within it, must ultimately appeal to interests.  If there is a justifi-
cation for why we should have the practice of private property, for example, and why 
this practice should assign the rights that our version of it does assign, then this justi-
fication will be that (our version of) this practice protects an interest that merits pro-
tection.  Interest Theory seems to err in that it is not the instantiated but the general 
right, for which we need to draw on interest, and in that the protected interests must 
not necessarily be those of the right-holder.  We can state this second part of Modal 
Theory as follows: 
(M2) The usage of the set of modals that define right R must be justified by 
appeal to an interest protected through this usage. 
Notice three things about M2:  (1) M2 does not imply that a right automatically arises 
as soon as there is an interest to be protected.  All it says is that it is interest by which 
rights are justified.  (2) M2 is compatible with a wide variety of ethical views because 
it is compatible with a wide variety of theories about the interests to be protected.  
(3) According to M2, it is not the individual right Ri which is justified by appeal to 
interest, but the general right R.  In the library scenario, for instance, it would not be 
my individual right in this particular computer, but the general right in personal be-
longings that forms part of our current practice of private property, which must be 
justified by interest. 
7 Avoiding the “Wrong Kind of Reason” Objection 
The view that I suggest belongs to a category sometimes called “practice views” or 
“conventionalist views.”34  Practice views have been accused of giving the “wrong 
kinds of reasons” for actions and beliefs, so let me briefly explain why my particular 
view avoids this objection. 
There actually are two such objections.  First, Thomas Scanlon has argued that 
John Rawls mistakenly depicts any practice-internal duty as “a general obligation to 
the members of the group who have contributed to and benefit from the practice.”35  
Rawls indeed justifies the duties that correspond to an individual right Ri through a 
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general duty of fairness that the holder of this duty has toward all other participants in 
the respective practice.36  An analogous move is made by rule-consequentialists:  They, 
too, justify the duties that correspond to an individual right Ri through a general duty 
to comply with the respective practice, only that this general duty is not justified by 
fairness but by the good which that practice furthers. 
No such indirect justification of individual rights and duties is implied by the 
view I suggest here.  Section 9 below lays this out in more detail.37  In a nutshell, I say: 
Ri must be justified through some empirical fact for which the rules of the practice 
assign R to people (and hence assign the corresponding duties to others).  For instance, 
the justification for why I have a right in this computer could be that I bought this com-
puter—an empirical fact for which the rules of our practice of private property assign 
me such a right and put all others under corresponding duties.  The justification of the 
practice of private property itself has no role in justifying my individual right, not even 
an indirect role. 
Second, inspired by Gregory Kavka’s toxin puzzle,38 it has become a common 
place that considerations showing that it would be good to believe or intend something 
are not always the right kind of consideration to serve as reasons for believing or in-
tending said thing.  Suppose, you promised me a fortune if I believed that the moon 
is made of cheese:  This would give me a (pragmatic) reason for intending to believe 
that the moon is made of cheese (or for attempting to get myself to believe it, e.g. by 
visiting a hypnotist), but it does not give me any (epistemic) reason to actually believe 
this.  Similarly, even if Y believed that there are good reasons to comply with the 
practice of private property and hence good pragmatic reasons to intend to believe that 
this computer is X’s, this would not provide good epistemic reasons for Y to believe that 
the computer indeed is X’s. 
Kavka’s puzzle poses a problem for Rawls and for rule-consequentialists, but 
not for the view I suggest.  On my account, Y’s reason for believing that the computer 
is X’s will be some empirical fact, such as that X bought the computer, or that X 
received the computer as a present, or that X won the computer in a lottery, etc.  It 
has nothing to do with legitimate interests that the practice of private property pro-
tects, not even indirectly. 
All social practices, I believe, have this structure:  There are two levels of justifi-
cation—justification of the practice and justifications within the practice.  What pro-
vides a good justification for beliefs or actions regarding the practice does not (at least 
not usually) provide a good justification for beliefs or actions within that practice and 
vice versa.  Take the example of a social practice for which this is more obvious than 
it might be for private property: money.  Most anthropologists think that human be-
ings adopt money where there is need to trade with people whose credit history is 
unknown and with whom one has no social bonds.39  From the outside, money resem-
bles a great social illusion:  The currency itself often is of little material value; never-
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theless all those engaged in the practice highly value the currency.  So a human com-
munity can have good reason to believe that they should introduce money.  And once 
the practice is in place, every single member has good reason to believe that the respective 
paper pieces are valuable.  This second good reason differs from the original good 
reason for adopting money:  It consists in the fact that others, too, treat the paper 
pieces as valuable, e.g. by accepting them in exchange for desirable objects.  Not only, 
however, do the two good reasons differ, but the good reason for beliefs about the 
paper pieces does not draw on the good reason for beliefs regarding the practice—not 
even indirectly.  In fact, individual agents might hold no beliefs at all regarding the 
question of what money in general is for, and they would still have good reason to 
believe in the value of the pieces of paper.  Similarly, Y can have good reason to believe 
that, e.g., this is X’s computer, or that he, Y, must not take the computer without X’s 
permission, without holding any beliefs about the question of what private property 
in general is for. 
8 Interest Theory’s Main Problem:  The Possessor 
of a Right Might Not Be Its Beneficiary 
As mentioned in the introduction, the standard problem for Interest Theory is that it 
cannot allow that we possess rights which exclusively or mainly serve the interest of 
others.  Much-discussed examples are the rights of legal guardians or the rights of 
office-holders.  (Thus, a policeman’s right to arrest someone does not serve this po-
liceman’s personal interest, but the interest of the political entity that employs him.)  
As for Will Theory, however, the set of counterexamples to Interest Theory is much 
larger than commonly discussed:  Any justification of a right for subgroups through 
appeal to the general interest contradicts Interest Theory.  Such appeals, however, are 
frequent in political discourse, and they seem to be correct as a form of argument 
(even if their respective content will sometimes be questionable). 
Take the following example:  In recent years, young people world-wide pro-
tested for the right to study without fees (in Chile, Germany and Hungary, for in-
stance)40 or at an affordable fee (for example in the UK, USA, Canada, Liberia, Nigeria 
and Taiwan).41  The right that they demand is free or affordable access to higher edu-
cation.  Their main justification for this demanded right can be rendered as follows:  
It is in the interest of all members of society that access to higher education be deter-
mined by talent, not money (and hence family background).  For, first, to regulate 
access in this way furthers good research and national productivity, and those are aims 
in which all members of society have an instrumental interest.  Second, to regulate 
access in this way is an important aspect of promoting social justice—given that today 
access to education determines access to all kinds of other resources—, and it is in the 
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interest of all members of society to live in a just society.  Whether you agree with 
these claims or not, the example illustrates two things: 
1. Interest is usually brought in at the justificatory stage.  It is not part of the 
specification of the right itself.  “We (students) demand the right to φ (study 
without or at affordable fees).  The reason we give for this is that granting 
us this right would further this-or-that interest (national productivity, social 
justice).”  In this, as in most other cases, the right itself can be specified 
without reference to interest, here as: “the right to study without/at afford-
able fees.”  Interests are mentioned in the attempt to justify the specified 
right:  It is because of all those benefits that granting the right would be ra-
tional. 
2. Often, it is not the right-holder’s interest which serves to justify a right.  
True, in the above example it is also in the interest of all those to whom the 
right would be granted that they should have this right.  (That is, all students 
and aspiring students profit from no or low fees.)  But the given justification 
does not even mention these potential right-holders.  It says that all mem-
bers of society, most of whom have no intention to attend university and 
will hence never possess the right, will benefit.  It is this general interest that 
justifies the right (if it does).  This pattern of justification seems to be typical 
for many of the discussions about rights that we actually have:  Very often, 
(claims for) rights for subgroups of a population are defended by appeal to 
the interest of the whole population.  And Interest Theory has given us no 
reason to believe that this form of argument is generally invalid. 
Notice that the first point, about specification, also holds where rights are denied. (The 
second point, about justification, does, too, of course—that is, it is not necessarily the 
right-holder’s interest which serves to justify denial of the right to her—, but that 
seems obvious.)  Consider the example of the recent large-scale protest in France 
against the right of homosexuals to adopt children.42  Protesters claimed that granting 
the discussed right to group A (adult homosexuals) would negatively affect the mental 
health of another group B (the children they adopt).  Again, whether you agree with 
this claim or not (and many found it outrageous), the right under discussion can be 
specified without reference to anybody’s interests—as “the right to adopt children”—
, and the point to bring in interest is where one is pressed for a justification:  This right 
must not be granted, because it would violate an important and legitimate interest. 
M2 separates the question of the justification of rights from the question of 
their possession.  It allows us to distinguish the bearer of a right from those whose 
interests this right generally protects, thereby allowing us to avoid Interest Theory’s 
standard problem.  As the above examples illustrate, however, it also has a further 
advantage:  It captures the role that interest plays in actual public discussions about 
rights. 
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9 The Possession of Rights 
I defined rights through sets of deontic modal claims, and I argued that the general 
right, but not its individual instantiation, must be justified through interests.  This 
leaves us with our third and last question, the question of the possession of rights. 
As with the question of justification, the answer to the question of possession 
must start from a distinction between the general right and its individual instantiation 
(see p. 14).  A property right in this item exists if (1) no one except ___ can use it, 
(2) ___ may destroy it, (3) all other must compensate ___ if they destroy it, etc.  The 
person who has this property right is the person whose name qualifies to fill in the 
blanks of these deontic modals.  Who, in turn, qualifies for that will be a matter of 
empirical facts on the one hand and the rules of the practice to which the general right 
belongs on the other.  According to the rules of our current property practice, for 
instance, you can come to qualify as the possessor of a property right through buying 
the item in question, through receiving it as a gift, through winning it as a prize etc.  
Whether you did this, is an empirical question.  (Did you, in fact, draw the lottery ticket 
with the winning number, e.g.?)  The possessor of a right hence is the person whose 
name can fill out the possessor blank (or: who can instantiate the possessor variable) 
that the deontic modals contain as which the right can be defined. 
(M3) X possesses right Ri just in case “X” can correctly be used to instanti-
ate the modals that define R, where correct means: in accordance with 
the rules of the practice to which R belongs, applied to the empirical 
facts. 
Anscombe summarizes her own conception as follows:  “I have located the generation 
of the concept of a right in a certain kind of use of a stopping modal […].  We have 
here a very special use of the name of a person, or a very special way of relating some-
thing to a person, which explains (not is explained by) the general term ‘right.’  Some-
thing is N’s to do, N’s to receive (as: a message), N’s to kill—as an ancient Roman 
would say about N’s children: the patria potestas.  The general term ‘right’ is constructed 
because, as it were, our language feels the need for it. As, for example, a general term 
‘relation’ was invented.”43 
10 Conclusions 
I have outlined a new role for authority and interest in the theory of right—the key 
concepts of the two currently dominant theories, Will and Interest Theory.  The re-
sulting Modal Theory of Right comprises three central claims: 
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(M1) Any right R can be defined through a set of stopping and forcing 
modals. 
(M2) The usage of the set of modals that define right R must be justified by 
appeal to an interest protected through this usage. 
(M3) X possesses right Ri just in case “X” can correctly be used to instanti-
ate the modals that define R, where correct means: in accordance with 
the rules of the practice to which R belongs, applied to the empirical 
facts. 
(1) I have argued that if we conceive of rights in this way, we can avoid the problems 
of Will and Interest Theory.  (2) I hope to have shown that Will Theory’s problems 
derive from a misconception of the connection between authority and rights, those of 
Interest Theory from a misconception of the connection between interests and rights.  
And instead of ad hoc patches for those problems, I have tried to provide a systematic 
solution.  (3) Although I have not demonstrated that authority and interest need to be 
part of a correct theory of right, I have tried to endow the new alternative with some 
independent credibility:  Modal Theory, I argued, analyzes rights through very basic 
and familiar concepts (p. 12); it accurately reflects actual public discourse about rights 
(Sect. 8), and it is compatible with a wide variety of ethical views (p. 14).  Given that it 
puts very few constraints on the relevant kind of interest, it can be combined with any 
ethical theory that can accommodate rights and that allows for rights to be grounded 
in interests.  This would include virtue ethics, for instance, certain forms of conse-
quentialism and also many of the contemporary Kantian accounts, which stress the 
role of Glückseligkeit. 
Modal Theory becomes available once we distinguish three questions:  First, 
in what does a right consist?  Second, what justifies rights?  And, third, who possesses 
a certain right?  On our alternative understanding, we need the concept ‘authority’ to 
answer the first question, while we need ‘interest’ to answer the second. 
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